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Available online xxxxThe aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between self-efficacy and falsememories using the Deese/
Roediger–McDermott (DRM) paradigm, whereby people falsely remember words not presented in lists. In two
studies participants were presented with DRM lists and asked to recall and recognize presented items. In the
first study, we found a significant relationship betweenmemory self-efficacy (MSE) and susceptibility to associa-
tive memory illusions, both in recall and recognition. They also received the Memory Self-Efficacy Questionnaire
(MSEQ), the Big Five Questionnaire (BFQ) and the backward digit span (BDS) test.
In the second study, MSEwasmanipulated in order to assess whether changes influenced the sensitivity param-
eter in DRM tasks. Results showed that the manipulation was effective in decreasing self-efficacy, which in turn
affected the probability of reporting critical lures as well as sensitivity. Possible explanations for the effect are
discussed.
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Working memory1. Introduction
Understanding individual differences in memory has become a cru-
cial topic in modern psychological research. Moreover to understand
the factors that influence memory illusions could help to improve the
applications in severalfields, like psychology of testimony, learning psy-
chology and psychotherapy. In particular, our interest is in understand-
ing the relationship between individual difference, asmeasured by state
and trait factors, and false memory as measured using the Deese/
Roediger–McDermott (DRM) paradigm.
In DRM paradigm, people study lists of associated words and then
take a recall or recognition memory test. Each presented list is semanti-
cally associated to at least one specific non-presented words (known as
critical lures; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) and are listed in backward
associative strength (BAS), such that themost strongly associated word
is presented first, then the second, and so forth. For example, one list in-
cludes sour, candy, sugar, bitter, good, taste, etc., which should elicit the
false recall of the critical lure sweet.
There are several theories that can explain from different point of
view theDRM illusion (seeGallo, 2010 for a review).Herewe shortly re-
port the Activation-Monitoring Theory (hereafter AMT) and the Fuzzy
Trace Theory (hereafter FTT). This theory concerns the interaction be-
tween twoprocesses. Thefirs process is the spread activation,whichde-
scribes a higher probability for critical lure being falsely remembered,
due to the repeated activation of characteristics that the critical lureapienza University of Rome, Via
. Iacullo).shares with the other words in the list. This leads to remember the crit-
ical word as a list word. Nevertheless, the theory accounts a monitoring
process that reduces false memories trying to determine the origins of
this activated information and that a falsememory occurwhen this pro-
cess fail (e.g., Roediger & McDermott, 2000; Roediger, Watson,
McDermott, & Gallo, 2001). (Benjamin, 2001; McDermott & Watson,
2001).
Also the FTT (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995; Brainerd & Reyna, 2002) as-
sumes the intervention of a monitoring process during the memory
task. However, differently from theAMT, this theory focuses on the stor-
age of meaning relations; indeed the main assumption is the separate
encoding of two type of memory trace: verbatim trace and gist trace.
A verbatim trace contains the surface form of presented words and, by
definition, it disappears earlier than the gist trace that is the representa-
tion of the listmeaning. According to FTT, a falsememory occurswith an
illusory recollection of the gist trace.
In the present paper, we describe two distinct studies. In the first
study we investigate the relationship between individual differences
and false memories. In the second one, we manipulated the self-
efficacy variable that we found to be related to false memories in the
first study.
Presently, not many researches are conducted on the relationship
between false memories and individual differences; most of them
have focused on the manipulation of the DRM paradigm (Watson,
Bunting, Poole, & Conway, 2005). In respect to this, (Sanford & Fisk,
2009) these studies showed a significant relationship between the asso-
ciative networks of semantic and episodicmemory and extroversion/in-
troversion dimensions of personality as measured by the Big Five
Questionnaire (BFQ) In the first study we retested the relationship
1 Therewere exclusion criteria that includedpsychiatric and learningdisorders estimat-
ed asking participants if they had experienced in the past psychiatric disorders or learning
disabilities and if they were used to assume drugs.
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studies investigated the relationship between MSE and Big Five of per-
sonality we are interesting in investigate it.
Even less research has been conducted regarding the focus of the
present study, namely on memory self-efficacy (hereafter MSE), it has
been conceptualized in two principal ways (Berry, 1999). In one ap-
proach, derived from Bandura's self-efficacy theory, MSE refers to the
belief of holding efficientmemory skills evaluated in the context of spe-
cificmemory tasks (Berry, 1996; Beaudoin&Desrichard, 2011). Another
approach, derived from the meta-memory framework, conceptualizes
MSE as “one's sense of mastery or capability to use memory effectively
in memory-demanding situations” (Hertzog, Dixon, & Hultsch, 1990).
In this approach, MSE is a generalized judgment that is abstracted
from specific tasks and situation characteristics.
Furthermore, in the present study we used MSE taking in to account
the Bandura's suggestions (1997), therefore as based on various sources
of information, including the appraisal of the relevant features of a task
and situation, aswell as task-specific, domain-specific, and global beliefs
about one'smemory abilities. One's concurrentMSE is based on the per-
ceived characteristics of thememory task to be performed, on personal-
state variables (e.g., concurrent physiological state and mood), and,
whether no previous experiencewith the task is available, onmore gen-
eralized beliefs about one's memory abilities (Hertzog et al., 1990).
Self-efficacy affects the ability to cope, which indirectly supports the
hypothesis that the level of MSE affects cognitive performance
(Heitzmann et al., 2011; Coffee & Rees, 2011). According to Bandura's
self-efficacy theory (1989, 1997), higher confidence in one's memory
leads to higher memory performance due to greater effort expenditure,
greater persistence in the face of difficulties, higher performance goals,
and lower state anxiety. Some studies have shown a significant positive
correlation between MSE and working memory (hereafter WM)
(Caldeira de Carvalho, Marcourakis, Artes, & Gorenstein, 2002; Potter
& Hartman, 2006), others reported thatWM is predictive of false recog-
nition (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Peters, Jelicic, Verbeek, &
Merckelbach, 2007). Since WM could mediate the relation between
MSE and DRM performance, we decided to include it in our analysis.
Because no previous study has assessed whetherMSE affects the ex-
tent to which people develop false memories, we investigated this hy-
pothesis using two different experiments. The focus of the first study
was to examine the relationship between falsememories and individual
difference traits mentioned above. In the second experiment, we tested
whether experimentally induced changes in MSE (considered as a state
variable) produce changes in memory performance.
Experimental studies which try to manipulate personal variables
such as MSE are rare, and in most cases do not include any measure of
memory performance (e.g. Sanbonmatsu, Harpster, Akimoto, &
Moulin, 1994). Among studies in which memory performance is
assessed, one did not report any MSE manipulation effect on memory
performance (Gardiner, Luszcz, & Bryan, 1997), while another reported
an effect of manipulation on both MSE and memory performance but
did not test whether the impact of manipulation on memory perfor-
mance was mediated by MSE changes (Nicoson, Dick, Lineweaver, &
Hertzog, 2008).
2. Study 1
The purpose of the first study was to investigate individual differ-
ences in false memory. Particularly we wanted to examine whether
MSE can determine memory performance, using the DRM paradigm.
In the DRM paradigm people study lists of associated words and then
take a free recall and recognition memory test. The typical result is
that people often falsely remember a non-studied criticalword associat-
edwith thewords in the list. According to self-efficacy theory (Bandura,
1989), individuals with lowMSE should be less willing than individuals
with higher levels ofMSE to expendmental effort during theDRM tasks.
We hypothesize that individuals with higher MSE are better able toinitiate intentional monitoring activities and screen out potential mem-
ory errors, including critical false memories, compared to individuals
with low levels of self-efficacy. Moreover, we expect that only MSE for
words is predictive of performance in the DRM paradigm, because this
scale is closer to DRM conditions than the MSE scales for groceries and
errands.
Furthermore, we tested the hypothesis that the confidence intervals
of the recognition task could be related to MSE as a meta-memory task.
As regards to BFQ, coherently with previous researches (e.g., Paddock,
Terranova, Kwok, & Halpern, 2000; Sanford & Fisk, 2009) we aspect
that extroverts produce a significantly greater number of false memo-
ries than introverts. In this study, we also assessed the role of WM in
predicting performance of a DRM task.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
Forty-one native English speakers students from the University of
Hull (UK), 10 were male, 31 were female (mean age = 20.6; SD =
4.35). Forty-one native Italian speakers students from the Sapienza Uni-
versity of Rome, 11weremale, 30were female (mean age=24.8; SD=
6.04).1
2.1.2. Materials
2.1.2.1. DRM lists. Study items were 14 of the lists rated by Stadler,
Roediger, and McDermott (1999) as producing medium levels of false
recognition. Each list consisted of 15 associations of a non-presented
critical lure (see Appendix A). The recognition test included a printed
sheet containing 28 studied words (two from each list), 14 critical
lures of the studied lists, plus 28 non-presented words semantically re-
lated with critical lures and 28 words unrelated to critical lures or any
other word in this list. As the Italian language does not possess as
many extensive association norms as the English language (Buchanan,
Holmes, Teasley, & Hutchison, 2013), we translated the original English
stimuli, matching use frequency, into Italian. For this purpose we re-
ferred to Corpus of Contemporary American English (Davies, 2008)
and Corpus e Lessico di Frequenza dell'Italiano Scritto (Corpus and Fre-
quency Lexicon of Written Italian) (Bertinetto et al., 2005).
2.1.2.2. Backward digit span (BDS). This test is used to measure WM, at-
tention, concentration, and mental control (Ostrosky-Solís & Lozano,
2006). In a typical test of memory span, a list of random numbers is
read out loud at a rate of one item per second. At the conclusion of the
list, participants are asked to recall all digits in reverse order. The test
begins with three digits, increasing one digit after each two sequences
of digits until people fail to report two sequences of the same length.
2.1.2.3.Memory self-efficacy questionnaire (MSEQ). This questionnaire in-
cludes the description of several memory exercises (classic laboratory
tasks and more everyday tasks) which must be carried out at different
levels (Berry, West, & Dennehey, 1989). Subjects are required to decide
whether or not they are capable of attaining each level of performance
for each task and to state their level of confidence. For this study we se-
lected three MSE scales: chores, groceries and words.
2.1.2.4. Big five questionnaire (BFQ). This is a personality test (Caprara,
Barbaranelli, Borgogni, & Perugini, 1993; Costa & McCrae, 1985) based
on five major dimensions: openness, conscientiousness, extraversion,
agreeableness and neuroticism. In this study, we used the 50 item
short version of BFQ.
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Subjects were tested individually in a room set up to avoid distrac-
tions and interference. DRM lists were administered in random order
through headphones connected to a computer. The words were pre-
sented with a frequency of one every 1.5 s. Subjects were instructed to
recall each list after listening to it. The request to recall the words in
the list followed the presentation of each list. Recall of all 14 lists was
followed by the backward digit span task administration. The DRM rec-
ognition task was then presented. For the recognition task, subjects
were asked to recognize the words presented in the lists from a recog-
nition list containing new and old words by indicating a level of confi-
dence for each item (4 = certainly old; 3 = probably old; 2 =
probably new; 1 = certainly new). After this step, the MSEQ and BFQ
questionnaires were presented and filled out.2.2. Results
2.2.1. Preliminary analysis
As previously explained, in this studywe used two language groups;
in order to compare DRM results we conducted some preliminary anal-
yses that showed some differences between the Italian and English
groups in correct recall and in correct recognition. For this reason, we
decided to analyze the two language groups separately. Nevertheless,
no significant differences were found between these two groups in the
MSEQ or false memory production.2.2.2. Recall
An overall two (languages: English and Italian) by three (type of re-
call: correct, critical and non-critical errors) ANOVA was computed on
recall scores. The results showed a main effect for type of recall, F (1,
80) = 419.59, ηp2 = 0.84, p ≤ 0.001 (Mhits = 0.58, SDhits = 0.08, Mcl =
0.39, SDcl = 0.18,Mn-cl = 0.07, SDn-cl = 05). While the performance in
the two language groups differed significantly in the proportion of cor-
rect recall, F(1.80) = 6.67, ηp2 = 0.07, p= 0.012 (Meng = 0.61, SDeng =
0.08, Mita = 0.56, SDita = 0.08), no difference was observed in false
memory production, either for critical recall, F(1.80) = 0.77, ηp2 =
0.01, p = 0.382 (Meng = 0.41, SDeng = 0.21, Mita = 37, SDita = 0.16),
or non-critical recall, F(1.80) = 0.946, ηp2= 0.01, p= 0.334 (Meng =
0.03, SDeng = 0.02,Mita = 0.04, SDita = 0.03).
In spite of the significant differences in correct recall, the curves of
the serial position in the recall task of English and Italian words had
the same trend. Fig. 1 shows the typical effect of the DRM paradigm,
i.e. a percentage of critical lures comparable to those of the words posi-
tioned in the middle of the list (this overlap is around 40% for both
groups).Fig. 1. First experiment:mean proportion ofwords correctly recalled by serial position and
mean proportion of critical lures falsely recalled averaged over all lists.2.2.3. Recognition
A similar ANOVAwas computed for the recognition scores. Similar to
the results in recall, there was a main effect of languages, F (1, 80) =
546.66, ηp2 = 0.87, p ≤ 0.001 (Mhits = 0.71, SDhits = 0.11, Mcl = 0.76,
SDcl = 0.22, Mrel = 0.24, SDrel = 12, Mnrel = 0.11, SDnrel = 07). More-
over, results showed a significant interaction between Italian group
and English group for hits, F (1, 80) = 5.78, MSE = 0.34, p = 0.018;
the English group reported a mean percentage of hits significantly
higher than the Italian group (respectivelyMeng = 0.74, SDeng = 0.12,
Mita = 0.68, SDita = 0.10). Instead, no significant difference between
the two languages in critical lure production was found, F (1, 80) =
1.67,MSE=0.01, p=0.20. Furthermore, a significant difference for un-
related errors, F (1, 80)=4.04,MSE=0.21, p=0.048 (see, Table 1)was
obtained but not for related errors, F(1.80) = 0.69, MSE = 0.40, p =
0.409.
With respect to confidence scores, in both languages critical lures
were recognized as occurring with the same frequency as presented
words. Critical lures, when judged as old, were reported with more
‘not sure’ responses than studied words. Vice versa, when a word was
judged as new, more certain responses for critical lures were reported.
Moreover, related errors were recognized as presentedwordsmore fre-
quently than unrelated errors; certain/probably judgments reflect this
result (see, Table 1).
Results of both recall and recognition showed that the translation of
the DRM lists into the Italian language did not change probability of the
list inducing false memory; the English group and Italian group were
comparable in this crucial dimension.
2.2.4. Individual differences
ANOVA conducted on data of the backward digit span test and the
MSEQ showed no differences between language groups. Significantly,
differences in three of the five BFQ scales were found: openness, F (1,
80) = 21.92, MSE = 0.62, p b 0.001; conscientiousness, F(1.80) =
16.98, MSE = 0.52, p b 0.001; and extraversion, F(1.80) = 8.01,
MSE = 0.62, p = 0.006 (see Table 2). No significant difference was
found in backward digit span scores between the English and Italian
groups.
Following analyses were computed combining English and Italian
scores. For this, we only considered variables that didn't show signifi-
cant differences between the two languages groups.
2.2.5. Multiple regression analysis
In order to define predictors of false memories, two stepwise multi-
ple regressions were conducted on critical lures for recall and recogni-
tion respectively. We considered as independent variables scores of
tests that didn't show significant differences between languages
(i.e., backward digit span, all MSEQ scales used in the study, extraver-
sion and neuroticism from the BFQ).
As expected, the variance in false memories during recall was ex-
plained by scores in the MSE word subscale, t (80) =−3.36, p b 0.01,
R2 = 0.21, which predicted false memories produced during recall,Table 1
First experiment recognition results: the proportion of items classified as certainly old (a
rating of 4), probably old (3), probably new (2), or certainly new (1) and themean propor-
tion of words recognized as presented in DRM lists.
Old New
Mean
rating
Study status
4 3 2 1
ENG ITA ENG ITA ENG ITA ENG ITA ENG ITA
Studied .61 .56 .13 .15 .16 .15 .10 .14 .74 .71
Nonstudied
Critical lure .55 .58 .20 .23 .10 .09 .15 .13 .74 .81
Weakly related lure .08 .08 .15 .17 .37 .26 .40 .42 .23 .25
Unrelated lure .05 .05 .05 .07 .41 .27 .49 .53 .10 .13
Table 2
First experiment ANOVA and mean of individual difference tasks.
English (n=
41)
Italian (n=
41)
Test Factor M DS M DS F (1.80)
BDS
Working memory 7.54 1.87 7.24 1.59 0.58
MSEQ
MSE grocery 27.59 7.4 30.78 7.73 3.66
MSE words 27.32 5.95 29.29 6.32 2.12
MSE errands 27.73 6.82 31.02 8.41 3.79
BFQ
Extraversion 38.85 6.16 38.44 4.32 0.12
Neuroticism 35.02 6.65 36.51 4.11 1.48
Openness 42.61 6.43 36.83 4.6 21.92⁎⁎⁎
Consciousness 42.17 5.65 37.90 3.48 16.98⁎⁎⁎
Agreeableness 41.80 6.18 38.32 4.91 8.01⁎⁎
Note—⁎⁎p b 0.01; ⁎⁎⁎p b 0.001.
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of critical lures produced during recognition.
2.2.6. Memory self-efficacy and false memories
Scores in the MSEQ for word subscale of the MSE dimension were
divided using the median score in order to create two groups of high
and low MSE words. Multiple ANOVA results (see Table 4) showed
no significant differences between the high MSE group and the low
MSE group for correct recall. As predicted, participants with high
self-efficacy showed lower levels for critical lures, F (1.80) = 10.17,
MSE=0.29, p=0.002, ηp2=0.113. No significant difference between
high and low MSE groups was found in correct recognition. Other-
wise, participants with high self-efficacy produced significantly
lower numbers of critical lures than participants of the group with
low MSE, F(1.80) = 8.74, MSE = 0.35, p = 0.004, ηp2 = 0.098. Inter-
esting, this result reflect the significant differences in confidence rat-
ings. In particular subjects with low MSE, when a critical false
memory occurs, report being more confident than the high MSE
group, F (1, 80) = 7.91, ηp2 = 0.09, p = 0.006 (Mlow = 0.63,
SDlow = 0.04, Mhigh = 0.46, SDhigh =0.04). On the other side, high
MSE group report a higher mean proportion in confident response
in correct rejections, F (1, 80) = 8.29, ηp2 = 0.09, p = 0.005
(Mlow = 0.08, SDlow = 0.03,Mhigh = 0.21, SDhigh = 0.03). No signifi-
cant difference was obtained for related errors, F (1, 80) =2.58,
MSE = 0.40, p = 0.11; conversely, a significant difference for unre-
lated errors was found, F (1, 80) = 4.98, MSE = 0.22, p = 0.028,
ηp2 = 0.059. As noted above, the unrelated errors score was signifi-
cantly different between English and Italian group so we computed
two separate ANOVA tests for the language groups using as indepen-
dent variable MSE for words and unrelated error score as theTable 3
First experiment: multiple regression, using enter method.
Recall of critical lure
Predictor β Semipartial r t(80) R2
Included variable
MSE words −0.60** −0.41*** −3.36** 0.21**
Excluded variable
MSE grocery 0.13 0.87
MSE errands 0.12 0.84
Extraversion 0.11 1.05
Neuroticism 0.08 0.77
Working memory 0.02 0.17
Note –F(1.81) = 3.09, p= 0.009.
**p b 0.01; ***p b 0.001.dependent variable. Results showed that there was a significant dif-
ference in the number of unrelated errors between high and lowMSE
participants, F (1, 80) = 9.22, MSE = 1.80, p = 0.004 in the English
group.
Finally, a significant difference between high and low MSE was ob-
tained in BDS score, F (1, 80)=15.41,MSE=0.19, p b 0.000, ηp2=0.162.
2.3. Discussion
We conducted separate preliminary analyses that reported sig-
nificant differences between the English and Italian groups. Howev-
er, no differences were found for the crucial variables (critical recall
and recognition) and the probability that a word will elicit the criti-
cal lure in a free association paradigm was observed, both in English
and Italian. The results of ANOVA and regression confirm our first hy-
pothesis: the tendency to produce falsememories in recall is predict-
ed by MSE scores. This however occurs only when MSE refers to
words. The MSE scales for errands and groceries did not predict the
results of the DRM task, because they referred to everyday situations,
as Berry et al. (1989)maintained. Furthermore, when a false recogni-
tion occurs, subjects reported a higher confidence as old item. On the
other side, high MSE group was more confident in correct rejection.
This result is in line with the meta-memory framework (Hertzog
et al., 1990) and supports the prediction that higher MSE reflects
the capability to use memory effectively in memory-demanding sit-
uations. In particular, high MSE seems to be effective in avoiding
false memories.
Our results are consistent with some studies reporting a positive
correlation between MSE and different forms of semantic memory
tasks (Gillström & Rönnberg, 1995; Schmidt, Berg, & Deelman,
2001). According to self-efficacy theory (Bandura, 1997), MSE affects
the level of performance attained on amemory task through its effect
on motivational and affective processes, such as mental effort expen-
diture (i.e., the amount of processing resources voluntarily allocated
to a task).
As found during the current study, low MSE is related to a less
efficient WM. Conversely, individuals with high MSE generally
have better performance levels in WM tasks. Nevertheless, our re-
sults showed no significant correlation between WM and DRM
performance.
Finally, previous studies have indicated that extraversion reli-
ably predicts self-efficacy (Tams, 2008), and that self-efficacy
plays a mediating role between personality and social interest or
perceived stress (Caprara, Alessandri, & Eisenberg, 2012; Nauta,
2004). In our study, extraversion was not correlated with any
variable.
3. Study 2
The aim of the second study was to explore the effect of manipu-
lating the level of MSE to produce false memories. As argued above,
we refer to MSE as a state variable that can be immediately influ-
enced by the perceived performance to the task. Previous research
(West, Bagwell, & Dark-Freudeman, 2005; West, Welch, & Thorn,
2001; Coffee & Rees, 2011; Le Foll, Rascle, & Higgins, 2008) shows
that when subjects receive feedback they engage more in a task
and display better performance than participants that receive no
feedback. Moreover, Desrichard and Köpetz (2005) suggest that the
influence of MSE on memory can be manipulated indirectly using
suggestive instructions. Furthermore, theories of cognitive consis-
tency assume that the discrepancy between beliefs and perceived
behavior creates a discomfort that motivates a person to reduce per-
ceived discrepancies (Abelson et al., 1968). Finally, McConnell and
Reed Hunt (2007) have shown that providing participants with feed-
back on their performance this feedback affected their subsequent
performance to the same task.
Fig. 2. Procedure of the second experiment.
Table 4
First experiment: ANOVA results for recall and recognition task; independent variable is memory self-efficacy for words.
High MSE (n= 19) Low MSE (n= 22)
Variable M SD M SD F(1.80) Observed Power
Recall
Studied word 124.82 18.92 121 15.98 0.98 0.165
Critical lure 4.55 2.34 6.31 2.64 10.17** 0.883
Non critical error 7.3 5.14 9.88 6.96 3.61 0.468
Recognition
Studied word 19.9 3.79 20.09 2.59 0.07 0.058
Critical lure 9.67 3.56 11.64 2.38 8.74** 0.823
Weakly related error 6.15 3.31 7.43 3.85 2.59 0.356
Non related error 2.62 1.75 3.59 2.15 4.99* 0.597
Working memory
Backward digit span 8.1 1.76 6.71 1.42 15.41*** 0.972
Note: * pb0.05; ** pb0.01; *** pb0.001.
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DRM recall performance. Both feedback types were introduced to alter
the level of self-efficacy of the participants. Coherently with results of
the previous study, we expect these three groups reporting different
performance in DRM task.
3.1. Method
The general method used was the same as that used in the first
study.
3.2. Participants
Forty-eight young Italian adults (M= 23.6, SD= 3.48) took part in
the study; 23weremale and 25were female. Each personwas tested in-
dividually in a room. Subjects were divided into three groups. Two
groupswere assigned to the experimental condition and one to the con-
trol group.
3.3. Materials
Twelve Italian DRM lists (used in the first experiment), recorded
using a male voice in digital audio format at the rate of one word
every 2 s were used. The 12 lists were randomly divided into two
sets of three and one set of six. The recognition test consisted, for
each DRM list, of one critical lure, two words included in the list
(positions two and nine), two non-presented words associated
with a critical lure and two words not associated with any other
word in this list. Lists were divided into three blocks: two by three
lists and a one by six list, with different lists per block across
participants.
Regarding MSEQ, in the present study the scale “chores” was re-
placed with “digits”, because digits is not referred to an everyday do-
main. Thus in this study we considered an everyday task (i.e.
grocery) and two laboratory domains (i.e. words and digits) but we
focused MSE manipulation on the words domain, and not on the
digits domain.
Furthermore, two parallel versions of the backward digit span were
used.
3.4. Procedure
All participants heard 12 DRM lists through headphones. The sub-
jects were told that this was a word experiment, that they will hear
several lists of words, and that at the end of each list (indicated
when the experimenter clicked on the pause button), they shouldwrite as many of the words down as they could remember (see
Fig. 2).
Firstly, participants filled out the MSEQ. Then they started to lis-
ten to the DRM lists. The subjects were given 2 mins to recall each
list after its presentation. After the last recall task of the first block
subjects were distracted with an arithmetic calculation task. After
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After the recognition task the experimenter gave a different feedback2
for each group about the memory performance. After the feedback the
second block started. This block was the same as the first, but instead
of an arithmetic task the backward digit span (BDS) test was conducted.
The third and final block contained six rather than three lists. After
the final recognition task, there was a three-minute interval in which
the participants performed the BDS test. Finally, participants received
the recognition task. During debriefing the researcher informed the sub-
jects that the feedback was independent from their real performance
and explained the aim of the experiment.3.5. Results
No significant difference for gender was found in pre-feedback
condition of self-efficacy and performance. At the end of the experi-
ment all participants judged the credibility of the feedback on a scale
of five points (1: not reliable; 5: totally reliable; M = 4.39, SD =
0.72).
An interaction between group condition (decreasing MSE, increas-
ing MSE and control) and time condition (pre-feedback and post-
feedback) was obtained; in particular it was statistically significant in
MSE for number, F(2.45) = 13.33, MSE= 25.26, p b 0.001, and MSE for
words, F(2.45) = 9.01, MSE= 25.26, p b 0.001. Moreover, we computed
multiple comparisons among each of the three levels of group condition
in both level of time condition for every possible dependent variable
(Table 5); results showed significant differences between increasing
and decreasing MSE groups and between control and increasing MSE
groups, but not between control and decreasing MSE groups (both in
MSE for number and for words).
Regarding DRM performance, the interaction between group and
time condition was statistically significant only for critical recall, F (2,
45) = 4.34, MSE= 0.04, p b 0.05. Contrast analysis showed a significant
difference in critical recall between control and decreasing groups and
between decreasing and increasing groups in post-feedback condition,
but not in pre-feedback condition. No significant interactions between
group and time condition were found in recognition scores and confi-
dence intervals.
Furthermore, we computed the system sensitivity (d’) and the crite-
rion just for the recall task, because in recognition no interaction effect
was found.3 These measures helped to better understand the actual im-
pact of feedback on the DRM effect.2 Subjects were randomly assigned to one of three groups. Two groups of participants
(experimental conditions) received two types of feedback on their performance. The con-
trol group did not receive any feedback. The information contained in the feedbackwas in-
dependent from the real performance in the DRM tasks. In the experimental high MSE
group, subjects were told that their performance ranked at the 75.3 percentile, while in
the low MSE experimental group subjects were told that their performance was low (i.e.
24.7 percentile). Self-efficacy theory suggests that in order for information to be persua-
sive it needs to come from an authoritative source; for this reason the subjects were told
at the beginning of the experiment that the memory performance would be computed
using a program. Indeed, during the recognition task, the experimenter acted as if recall
datawas being entered into data software in order to computememory performance even
though real performances had nothing to do with the feedback that was presented. Feed-
back needed to be very specific (containing a decimal) because a specific score is more
credible, and it seems more plausible than generic information. Furthermore, the second
type of feedbackwasmore coherent than thefirst. If participantswere told that their score
was 75.3% during initial feedback, subsequent feedbackmentioned that their performance
was 79.7% (increasing MSE). Conversely, if the initial feedback reported 24.7%, then it was
reduced after the second block to 20.3% (decreasing MSE). Considering previous studies
that induced changes in the sense of self-efficacy through feedback (Litt, 1988; Jacobs,
Prentice-Dunn, & Rogers, 1984), we assumed that this score oscillation was sufficient to
induce a change in self-efficacy and at the same time provided plausible and credible in-
formation (only two subjects said they did not believe the information provided by the ex-
perimenter; they were eliminated from the data set).
3 The first result was computed subtracting the z mean score of critical (false) recall
from the z mean score of hits. The criterion was also calculated as the ratio between the
z mean scores of hits and critical lures (β= zhits/zcriticallures) and indicated the choice of
recalling a word that could be a false memory (Heit, Brockdorff, & Lamberts, 2004).Results show a group by time interaction for d’: the decreasing
self-efficacy group effectively reduced the system sensitivity com-
pared to the increasing self-efficacy group, F (2, 45) = 3.19,
MSE = 0.08, p = 0.05. Multiple comparisons highlighted a signifi-
cant d’ difference between decreasing and increasing group perfor-
mance. On the other hand, no criterion differences between control
and experimental group were obtained. No effect for WM task was
found.
3.6. Discussion
We found two groups by time condition interaction effects. The
first was on MSE that significantly went in the predicted direction
for two different experimental groups. Consistent with results from
our first study and that conducted by Berry et al. (1989), different
MSEQ subscales predicted memory domains they referred to. In
fact, we obtained an interaction effect just for laboratory memory
task self-efficacy. Nevertheless we couldn't discriminate between
MSE for digits and number; it would be interesting to build a MSE
scale for false memories, in order to better understand the MSE and
false memory relationship.
The second interaction effect was on critical lures recall. In the
decreased self-efficacy condition there were significantly more crit-
ical lures than in the two other conditions (increase and control).
We demonstrated that decreasing/increasing self-efficacy feedback
procedures induced a substantial changing of sensitivity (d’), while
no significant difference was observed in the criteria. As predicted,
subjects assigned to decreasing groups exhibited a worse perfor-
mance in the last block, unlike the increasing group. Decreasing
MSE feedback probably induced people to believe that they were
not able to improve their memory performance giving rise to a
worse DRM performance. On the other hand, increasing feedback
induced people to believe in themselves and to maintain their per-
formance. We cannot explain which types of feedback (positive/
negative) better influenced memory performance in DRM tasks be-
cause no difference between the control group and experimental
group was found. However, the significant difference in sensitivity,
between decreasing and increasing self-efficacy groups, is congru-
ent with some evidence from previous research, showing that low
MSE is associated with low willingness to expend mental effort
and with high cognitive anxiety, both of which reduce the amount
of processing resources available for performing a task. Our results
can be explained when considering that the differences in sensitiv-
ity depend on different degrees of cognitive effort in the increasing
and decreasing groups. Indeed high MSE consists in greater effort
expenditure, greater persistence in the face of difficulties, higher
performance goals, and lower state anxiety, which, as we showed,
reduce DRM illusion propensity.
Coherently with McDougall and Kang (2003) statement, that
memory self-efficacy may or may not predict performance, depend-
ing on the congruence between predicted memory tasks and the
memory tasks actually performed, in our study the feedback influ-
enced recall performance, but not recognition andWMperformance.
Future research could consider replicating this experiment using
feedback on recognition, also in order to extend the results of the
first study that showed a significant effect of MSE on confidence rat-
ings of critical false recognition.
3.7. General discussion and conclusions
We investigated an uncharted question: can the memory self-
efficacy affects the production of false memories?
In study 1, we found that MSE is related to WM and false memory.
Moreover, the tendency to produce falsememories in recall is predicted
by a meta-memory component: the MSE. Indeed, coherently with SE
theory (Bandura, 1997), we speculate that people who had a resilient
Table 5
Second experiment: contrast test for MSEQ subscale and DRM performance in time (pre-feedback and post-feedback) between experimental conditions (increasing and decreasingMSE)
and control group. F represents interaction effects between group (decreasing MSE, increasing MSE and control) and time (pre/post-feedback) condition.
Contrast
Pre-feedback Post-feedback Mixed ANOVA 3 × 2
Control ∗
decreasing
Control ∗
increasing
Decreasing *
increasing
Control ∗
decreasing
Control ∗
increasing
Decreasing ∗
increasing F(2.45) ηp2
Observed
power
MSE for digits 13.33*** 0.37 0.99
Value of contrast −0.75 1.06 1.81 1.31 −9 −10.31
Std. error 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.44 3.44 3.44
t(45) −0.23 0.33 0.56 0.38 −2.61* −2.99**
MSE for words 9.01** 0.29 0.96
Value of contrast −3.18 −1.62 1.56 −0.31 −8.68 −8.37
Std. error 2.85 2.85 2.85 3.03 3.03 3.03
t(45) −1.11 −0.57 0.55 −0.10 −2.87** −2.77**
Critical recall 4.34* 0.16 0.72
Value of contrast 0.04 0.04 0.01 −0.24 0 0.24
Std. error 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
t(45) 0.46 0.47 0.01 −2.47* 0 2.47*
d’ 3.19* 0.12 0.58
Value of contrast −0.06 −0.11 −0.04 0.18 −0.08 −0.27
Std. error 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
t(45) −0.68 −1.14 −0.46 1.83 −0.79 −2.64*
Note—⁎p b 0.05; ⁎⁎p b 0.01; ⁎⁎⁎p b 0.001.
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more effective coping strategies. Berry (1996) demonstrated that
enhancement of memory performance depends on enhancing effica-
cy beliefs, which in turn increases resource allocation and the
cognitive effort needed for deeper levels of cognitive processing
(i.e., elaborative and associative coding and mental rehearsal). In
turn, these beliefs are thought to lead to less effort expenditure,
less persistence in the face of difficulties, lower performance goals,
and higher anxiety during memory tasks, all factors that may lead
to poorer performance on memory tasks (Bandura, 1989; Berry,
1999). Our results support this hypothesis.
We believe that the experimental procedure used in the second
study significantly influenced the recall task, because, as the cognitive
consistency theory predict, feedbacksmotivated subjects to reduce per-
ceived discrepancies between their MSE and their perceived perfor-
mance (Abelson et al., 1968), which in this case was strongly
influenced by the feedback that we provided, in that specific memory
domain (Bandura, 1997).
Considering DRM performance, the interpretation of our findings
is most consistent with the FTT of false memory. According to this ac-
count, more false memories in decreasing MSE group occur because
of a more comprehensive gist recollection strategy that the first
group assumes in order to improve their disappointing memory per-
formance. Significantly, this strategy had no consequences on the
recollection of presented words because it depends on verbatim
trace.
On the contrary, we think that the AMT does not explain our find-
ings as well as FTT. The reason is that in this case a more liberal mon-
itoring decision criterion (Miller, Guerin, & Wolford, 2011) in
decreasing MSE should have produced more false memories but
also more correct recall, resulting in a significant difference of the
criterion parameter β between the two experimental groups. How-
ever, that is not what we observed.
The only way to explain our findings, using the AMT, is pointing out
that MSE influenced both activation and monitoring processes. Never-
theless, it seems not so plausible to us that a metacognitive process
could influence an automatic process, as the spread activation, in so lit-
tle time and just after two feedbacks.
To conclude our two studies together coherently show that the level
of MSE for words is related to memory performance in DRM tasks and
that it has a causal effect on memory performance.In the future, new researcheswill be requiredwhich improve the ex-
perimental procedure aimed at assessing other possible feedback effects
on the DRM task or other memory tasks; certainly other false memory
paradigms based on episodic memory (e.g., the misinformation effect:
Loftus, 2005; and imagination inflation: Garry, Manning, Loftus, &
Sherman, 1996; Mazzoni & Memon, 2003).
3.8. Limitations of the present research
A limit of this study is the lack of a BAS index for recognition
distracters and ItalianDRM lists, due to lack of a sufficientlywide corpus
of associative norms in Italian.
Appendix AA.1. Critical words and 15 words of English DRM lists
ANGER: mad, fear, hate, rage, temper, fury, ire, wrath, happy, fight, hatred, mean,
calm, emotion, enrage
CHAIR: table, sit, legs, seat, couch, desk, recliner, sofa, wood, cushion, swivel, stool,
sitting, rocking, bench
CITY: town, crowded, state, capital, streets, subway, country, New York, village,
metropolis, big, Chicago, suburb, county, urban
MOUNTAIN: hill, valley, climb, summit, top, molehill, peak, plain, glacier, goat,
bike, climber, range, steep, ski
MUSIC: note, sound, piano, sing, radio, band, melody, horn, concert, instrument,
symphony, jazz, orchestra, art, rhythm
NEEDLE: thread, pin, eye, sewing, sharp, point, prick, thimble, haystack, thorn,
hurt, injection, syringe, cloth, knitting
RIVER: water, stream, lake, Mississippi, boat, tide, swim, flow, run, barge, creek,
brook, fish, bridge, winding
RUBBER: elastic, bounce, gloves, tire, ball, eraser, springy, foam, galoshes, soles,
latex, glue, flexible, resilient, stretch
SLEEP: bed, rest, awake, tired, dream, wake, snooze, blanket, doze, slumber, snore,
nap, peace, yawn, drowsy
SLOW: fast, lethargic, stop, listless, snail, cautious, delay, traffic, turtle, hesitant,
speed, quick, sluggish, wait, molasses
SMOKE: cigarette, puff, blaze, billows, pollution, ashes, cigar, chimney, fire,
tobacco, stink, pipe, lungs, flames, stain
SWEET: sour, candy, sugar, bitter, good, taste, tooth, nice, honey, soda, chocolate,
heart, cake, tart, pie
THIEF: steal, robber, crook, burglar, money, cop, bad, rob, jail, gun, villain, crime,
bank, bandit, criminal
TRASH: garbage, waste, can, refuse, sewage, bag, junk, rubbish, sweep, scraps, pile,
dump, landfill, debris, litter
(from Stadler, Roediger & McDermott, 1999)
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RABBIA*: furioso, paura, odio, sdegno, malumore, furore, ira, collera, felice, lotta,
arrabbiato, avversione, meschino, calma, emozione, imbestialire.
SEDIA*: tavolo, sedersi, gambe, sedile, divano, scrivania, pieghevole, sofà, legno,
cuscino, girevole, sgabello, seduto, poltrona, panchina.
CITTÀ*: cittadina, affollato, stato, capitale, strade, metropolitana, paese, Roma,
villaggio, metropoli, grande, Milano, sobborgo, contea, urbano.
MONTAGNA: collina, valle, salita, cima, colle, picco, pianura, ghiacciaio, capra,
bicicletta, scalatore, alta, scosceso, sciare.
MUSICA*: nota, suono, pianoforte, cantare, radio, banda, melodia, corno, concerto,
strumento, sinfonia, jazz, orchestra, arte, ritmo.
AGO*: filo, spillo, occhio, cucire, acuto, punto, puntura, ditale, pagliaio, spina, ferita,
iniezione, siringa, tessuto, maglia.
FIUME*: aqua, torrente, lago Tevere, barca, marea, nuotare, flusso, corrente, chiatta,
affluente, ruscello , pesce, ponte, sinuoso.
GOMMA: elastico, rimbalzo, guanti, pneumatico, palla, cancellare, molla,
gommapiuma, galosce, suole, lattice,colle, flessibile, estendere, allungare.
SONNO*: letto, riposo, sveglio, stanco, sogno, svegliare, pisolino, coperta,
sonnecchiare, assopito, russare, siesta, pace, sbadiglio, sonnolento.
LENTO*: veloce, inerte, fermo, svogliato, lumaca, prudente, ritardo, traffico,
tartaruga, esitante, velocità, rapido, pigro, attendere, piano.
FUMO*: sigaretta, soffio, accendino, nube, inquinamento, cenere, sigaro, camino,
fuoco, tabacco, puzza, pipa, polmoni, fiamme, macchia.
DOLCE*: acido, caramella, zucchero, amaro, buono, sapore, dente, goloso, miele,
lievito, cioccolato, cuore, pasticcino, crostata, torta.
LADRO*: rubare, rapinatore, truffatore, scassinatore, denaro, poliziotto, cattivo,
scippatore, carcere, pistola, furfante, criminalità, banca, bandito, criminale.
SPAZZATURA*: immondizia, rifiuti, bidone, pattume, liquame, busta, rottami,
scarti, spazzare, frammenti, cumulo, scaricare, discarica, detriti, sporcizia.
⁎ Used in the second study too.
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